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. Introduction: First Considerations Concerning Conversation
Analysts’ Assembling of Data Collections and Adducing
Comparisons
This paper is only a first move towards a more developed critique. It
is still piecemeal and contains lacunae. It will be devoted to an initial
consideration of the implications of the making of collections of con-
versational data instances (or, more tellingly, ‘data excerpts’), within
the approach of Conversation(al) Analysis (CA).
‘The’ Comparative Method is very much the method of CA’s alter-
nate, Formal-Analytic (FA) Sociology. FA comprises the range of clas-
sical and orthodox sociologies that are committed, by and large, to
some version of neo-Kantian epistemology, and an associated com-
mitment to a project of literal description. Indeed, ’the’ Comparative
Method has often been taken as the core or even sole method of FA
sociologies, their sine qua non. One question, then, concerning the
making of comparison in CA is: can these be effectuated without con-
cession to FA? Similar questions may be posed for CA practitioners
in linguistics, given a virtually equivalent commitment to FA (and, cer-
tainly, Formalism), along with a concomitant commitment to compar-
ative work, in that discipline. To these practitioners, however, I must
say that the original relevances both of CA and EM are sociological. It
. I wish to thank Bruno Bonu, co-ordinating editor of this special issue, for his
patient guidance during trying times in the development of this paper. I wish also to
thank the two anonymous reviewers for some particularly thoughtful and profound
criticisms and suggestions. Errors that remain are mine.
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is to these constraints that CA must respond, despite its appropriation
by linguistics and the attempt to judge it on linguistic constraints.
In this Introduction, however, I shall seek to eschew the usual
sheer opposition of one epistemological stance against another. I
intend to bring Ethnomethodology (EM) into a more explicit rela-
tion with contemporary CA, partly by issuing a reminder about their
common origins. In so doing, I shall espouse the analytic mentality
held in common by EM and CA practitioners to reject straightfor-
wardly philosophical oppositions (e.g. correspondence versus coher-
ence epistemologies) as well as purely theory-driven, theory-formed
approaches and substantive stipulations. All too often, such straight
philosophizing leads to sociologists treading unsteadily and unwisely
in the domain of professional philosophers, frequently producing boy
scout versions of the real thing. Such versions of philosophy have
bedevilled sociology throughout most of its th-century existence as
is shown by von Wiese and Becker’s acerbic comments, made back in
, on ‘near-phenomenology’ (v. Wiese and Becker, , p. ):
sadly, their remarks still pertain today.
Instead, I intend to abide by the analytic mentality of EM and (at
least, early) CA in transforming epistemological considerations into
methodological ones. One of the few philosophers (along with some
Pragmatists) that can assist in practical ways in the bringing about
of such a transformation is Abraham Kaplan (Kaplan ). His
book, significantly sub-titled A Methodology for the Social Sciences,
certainly did not provide a direct line into the EM approach but nev-
ertheless proved very influential in early British discussions about that
approach—particularly in the Manchester EM group a few years later.
Kaplan (, p. – and passim) considers the often unreflective
analytic practice of ‘equivalence classing’, which lies at the very heart
of contemporary CA—as well, of course, as, for instance, FA sociol-
ogy and linguistics. Establishing equivalence relations in equivalence
classing is the ‘building block’ for subsequent practices such as collo-
cation and constructing collections, or systematically comparing like
with like, and like with unlike, and so on—what we might term the
‘bread and butter’ practices of CA (inter alia).
With these primary considerations in mind, the structure of this
paper falls into place. First, some elaboration both of my approach
and of equivalence classing will be undertaken. Then, equivalence
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classing as a laic, i.e. ordinary members’ practice based in mundane
reason will be examined. As well, I shall make recommendations
for the non-ironic analyses of these ‘naturally-occurring, naturally-
situated, naturally-organized’ equivalence classes and of the ordinary
activities of collection, co-selection, comparison, etc. of which these
classes are placed in service. Finally, I shall consider equivalence class-
ing and the derivative activities for which it is the precondition, as
practiced, implicitly or explicitly, in professional/analytic sociology.
In another book that was very influential in Manchester, Cicourel
(Cicourel, , p. ), claims that equivalence classing is precondition
for counting and measurement and that language uses are inevitably
involved in such classing—language uses both of laic and professional
status (where the latter are variously, but inevitably, embedded in
the former). Cicourel, too, observes that equivalence classing is an
indispensable ‘building block’ for analytic practices such as counting,
measuring, collecting or collocating, comparing, contrasting, identi-
fying ‘deviant cases’, etc.—and to sociology we may also add that
there is no exemption for linguistics from these considerations. Some
methologically-radical critiques of some practices of CA will be made.
Whilst EM constitutes the basis for several of the concerns I shall
bring to bear (though not all; again, Kaplan’s work does not fall under
the aegis of EM, though it has been invoked in some EM), I do not
regard my position as subjecting CA to the rubric and constraints of
EM per se. To simply subordinate CA to EM or to drive EM as what
Crews (, p. –) calls a ‘master transcoding device’ through
CA is to risk the very theoreticism that EM disavows and against crit-
ics such as Crews so trenchantly inveigh.
Instead I wish to propose a strictly initial move in a debate that I
trust will ensue. I do hope that this move, prefatory as it is, will help us
move toward a ‘bullet-proof’ conception of intersubjectivity in action
when it comes down to cases (as Al Capone said it all does). Not
all these praxeological considerations of intersubjectivity will come
from EM: after all, John C. Heritage has vividly referred to local con-
versational sequencing as furnishing an ‘architecture of intersubjec-
tivity’, and gives a particularly convincing exhibition of that charac-
terization with regard to adjacency-paired utterances (Heritage ,
p. –). That is to say, my aim is to address an analytic concep-
tion of intersubjectivity-in-action that does not, for instance, impose
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an external standard or otherwise stipulate, does not commit logical
or methodological errors such as conflation, category-mistakes, the fal-
lacy of unwarranted extrapolation or is not otherwise intersubjectively
problematic. In addition to their shared beginnings, EM and CA have
each made too many major contributions to these issues to simply sub-
ject one to the other.
The continuity between elements of EM and CA derive in large part
from the commonalities in their origins, and consist in such as the
following: i) CA’s detailed concern for the local organization of talk-
in-interaction, which in my view is a very important ‘take’ on EM’s
recommendation—largely empirically unfulfilled by EM itself—that
members’ mastery of the natural language should be a (perhaps the)
core concern (viz Garfinkel and Sacks, , p. –; reprinted in
Garfinkel , p. –; the fact that this is a conjoint paper is most
significant), and ii) EM’s concern with the analysis of practices, includ-
ing conversational practices, as naturally—indexically, reflexively—
embedded in an inextricable way within a local gestalt contexture (viz:
Wieder, , p. –). The notion of a gestalt contexture has been
around ethnomethodology from the moment of its inception in the
s, as a result of Garfinkel’s conversation with Aron Gurwitsch
whilst he (Garfinkel) was a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University.
Establishing equivalence relations is integral to our procedures for
attributing, finding or enhancing order in a set of phenomena or an
array of phenomenal details, be these procedures laic or professional.
Indeed, a central preoccupation of EM is the relation between laic
and professional apprehensions of social orders, and the ineluctable
embeddedness of the latter in the former (though such embeddedness
is, arguably, increasingly being overlooked in some contemporary EM
worksite studies dealing with expert knowledge and expert systems).
These ‘embeddedness’ issues potentiate such questions as: does this
or that approach in professional sociology ground its analysis in laic
categories and/or turn them into a topic for explication on their own
behalf ? Or does a given professional sociologist seek to privilege their
own apprehension of order as against those of members? Do they, wit-
tingly or otherwise, establish a disjunction between the two, do they
even seek to establish a competitive stance between the two such that
practical, commonsense apprehensions are debunked (Berger, ,
p. –), undercut, downgraded, downranked, relativized or even
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ignored altogether (all of which are what sociologists term ‘method-
ological irony’ and what EM and, in principle, CA, radically oppose)?
Indeed, I shall comment below on the decontextualising practices that
create such disjunctions. In doing so, I shall also be suggesting that CA
is beginning to risk regression to the methodological ironies of FA.
As Kaplan states (ibid., p. ), the practice of establishing that two
or more objects are equivalent to one another involves the imputation
of identity, equality and synonymy. To these, Cicourel (ibid., p. )
adds the property of reflexivity (in a broadly symbolic interaction-
ist sense of this term), given the de facto social-interactional nature
of sociology’s data. The relations between objects deemed equivalent
are—to employ Kaplan’s terms—symmetrical and transitive, the clas-
sic instance of transitivity being, of course, that if a is equivalent to b
and b to c, then we can pass over b to state that a is equivalent to c.
Of course, as Kenneth Burke (, p. ) claims, we must be careful
to distinguish between equivalence and similarity, but to pursue the
potentially significant implications of this for at least some CA falls
beyond the purview of this paper, given space and time limitations.
A strong definition of CA collections can by adapted from a general
formulation by Kaplan (idem, p. ), namely that a collection is an
equivalence class of isomorphs—or what CA treats and transcribes as
isomorphs: again, this could be one object of an EM worksite study
of CA practice (viz: Sharrock and Anderson, , Ch.).
It should be remarked here that FA’s aims have long included that of
equivalence classing. Indeed, one of the high priests of FA mathema-
tization of social objects, Hubert M. Blalock Jr., expresses the aim of
establishing equivalence across settings—though even then he has to
build into this exercise a ‘disturbance variable’ to identify cross-setting
variation, (Blalock, , p. ). This ‘disturbance variable’ hedge
attests once again to Garfinkel’s observations on sociologists’ attempts
in vain to create freestanding objective expressions from indexical ones.
For us, though, the telling issue is that CA’s analytic operations of col-
lecting, comparing and contrasting, involve the selfsame establishing
of equivalence across settings. One is led to wonder just how far CA
has emancipated itself from FA’s ways. Maybe this is one source of
what commentators such as Lynch and Bogen identify as the ‘scien-
tism’ of CA.
The point that will be made in the early part of this paper is one
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made by Cicourel (see above) and, even earlier, by Rose () namely
that ordinary language and reasoning are redolent with ‘common-
sense equivalence classes’ and one major locus of these is in what
Harvey Sacks (, passim, vol. ) termed ‘membership categories’,
‘membership categorizations’, standardized relational pairs (of mem-
bership categories)’, ‘naturally-occasioned category co-selections’, etc.
Of course, as Rose shows, these laic equivalence classes operate in and
influence professional social-scientific uses, too, in ways that are still
largely unexplicated. The laic equivalence classes are both primordial
to and formative of the professional ones, and it is with these that we
shall therefore begin, by examining the practices involving member-
ship categories in effectuating ordinary-language comparisons.
Cicourel (ibid., p. ) pertinently notes that the establishing of equiv-
alence classes involves reification. One such form of reification, among
many others (see my observations on Smith, below), involves the pre-
sentation of the isomorph as a bounded object by cutting it off from
its immediate context. Thus, an isomorph is an assembled object, one
that is put together by removing it from its differentiating context, a
context of distinctively-identifying detail, or, at the very least, applying
a mutatis mutandis rider along with the ad hoc practice that Garfinkel
terms ‘et cetera’ (Garfinkel, , p. - and p. –). One argu-
ment concerning CA is that in making collections and comparisons it
is, in some of its areas and in some significant respects, increasingly
involving itself in just such reifying operations. Of course, detail dif-
ferences within the equivalence class perforce remain and cannot be
expunged; recall again Garfinkel’s comments (idem, p. –) on FA
sociologists’ attempts in vain to make ‘objective’ analytic expressions
from ‘indexical’ ones. We might say that, as ever, ‘equivalence’ is equiv-
alence only when subject to these limiting and qualifying procedures,
these aspects of what we can, with Kaplan, call the ‘logic-in-use’ of
equivalence classing. We might call this ‘equivalence for all practical
purposes’, be these purposes laic or analytic. Whilst this argument
might seem to be referring largely to FA sociology, we might suggest
that it applies to FA linguistics too: as the customary English expres-
sion has it, “If the cap fits, wear it.”
It would be a methodological irony to treat ordinary society-members’
(henceforth: ‘members’) equivalence classes as the ‘poor relations’ of
the professional ones. After all, equivalence classes of each status
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are subject to similar ad hoc procedures that render, for their var-
ious practical purposes, each isomorph an undiscriminated object
amongst its fellows. Whatever its presumed status, equivalence class-
ing is, ineluctably, a contingent accomplishment.
A note on the term ‘laic.’ The term has been EM currency for
approximately fifteen years or more, and I use it here in strict accor-
dance with Eric Livingston’s definition and extended specification
(Livingston, , p. xvii and p. –). I have applied it here to Liv-
ingston’s intended referent, namely the making and reading of tex-
tual objects—in the present case, transcripts of naturally-occurring,
naturally-analysable oral interchanges, I have also extended it—again,
in keeping with Livingston’s specification—to ordinary phenomena
such as the making of naturally-analysable collections in ordinary oral
interchanges. As with the term ‘lay’, no religious meaning is implied.
One useful advantage of the term ‘laic’ over the term ‘lay,’ not noted
by Livingston, is afforded by its relative strangeness. Through this
strangeness it can occasion a ‘look again’ attitude to the perhaps over-
familiar phenomena it describes.
Now to more specific CA issues, with the reminder that without
establishing equivalence there can be no systematic comparison.
. The Origins of the Concern for Comparison in CA
In the work of the founder of CA, Harvey Sacks, the issue of com-
parison comes up with some frequency. In his Lectures on Conversa-
tion (published in , though the lectures were given in the ’s and
early ’s), virtually all his analysis concerning comparison, equiva-
lence classes, contrasts addresses these as laic phenomena—that is, as
members’ practices deployed at, and oriented towards, at the common-
sense level. Thus, comparison, equivalence and contrast are analysed
as society-members’ own ordinary practices conducted through mun-
dane reasoning. He referred to laic comparison and equivalence class-
ing (Sacks, : vol. , p. , p.  and vol. , p. –), standards of
comparison and members’ measurements (idem: vol. , p. ), com-
pliments protected against comparison, (idem: vol. , p. –), mem-
bership categorisations and comparisons (idem: vol. , p. –). He
refers to the “standout” property of contrasts (idem: vol. , p. –
), attention to and optionality of contrasts (idem: vol. , p. –
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and vol. , p. –), contrast as a sequential technique (idem: vol. ,
p. ), verbs and verb tenses in relation to contrasts, (idem: vol. ,
p. –), how contrasts are found and what work they do (idem: vol. ,
p. –). Often, Sacks writes not so much about mere contrasts but
about contrast classes, and this is his approach to comparisons, too:
equivalence and difference are at the heart of these concerns.
Parenthetically, we can also note that laic contrasts have also been
studied by those whose analytic persuasion approximates considerably
more towards very early EM. For instance, Dorothy E. Smith expli-
cates a variety of two-part and three-part contrast structures in a dis-
course in which a party to the discourse claims the person being talked
about through these structures is mentally ill, (Smith, : p. –).
In a sense, Smith writes about how these structures work through an
“instructed hearing” of the contrast, where the contrast in turn fur-
nishes an “instructed seeing” of the person who is the object of the
conversation as being mentally ill.
All the above references are explications of lay members’ own com-
parative or contrastive work as an entirely mundane practice. All of
them, one way or another, attest to Garfinkel’s (: p. – and
Garfinkel , p. ) famous comment on the indistinguishability of
what was said and how it was said. Thus:
. . . what parties talked about could not be distinguished from how
they were speaking. An explanation of what the parties were talking
about would then consist entirely of describing how the parties had
been speaking; of furnishing a method for saying whatever is to be
said. . . . Then the recognized sense of what a person said consists
only and entirely in recognizing the method of his speaking, of seeing
how he spoke. (Garfinkel, : p. –)
Garfinkel’s comments seem to me to excellently express the basis
and justification of CA as well as formulating common cause with
EM: it is also my warrant for my furnishing an EM-based conception
of CA and vice versa. It is important that Garfinkel is not arguing
that “what” aspects of the conversation should simply be analytically
converted into “how” aspects, that the content or substance of conver-
sations be transformed by the analyst into “something else”, another
separately-bounded entity, namely one or more conversational proce-
dures. Rather, Garfinkel is saying that the “what” in conversation is
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entirely coterminous with the “how”. What is compared consists in
how it is compared. It is this and other aspects of the EM “take” on
CA operations with which I shall be concerned in this paper.
. Comparison in Members’ Practices
It is instructive to consider the above comments on laic compari-
son and contrast with Sacks’ and his colleagues’ somewhat later arti-
cle (originally Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, : my references will
come from the slightly modified, updated version in Schenkein, ).
In the excerpts below, an elderly woman is telephoning a crisis inter-
vention centre, threatening to kill herself, declaring her problems and
attempting to negotiate a visit from one of the centre’s personnel.
Telephone call to a Crisis Intervention Centre
Co = telephone counsellor and C = caller
Excerpt D
D.249 I am going to tell you this, I am only one in a million, but I’ll
D.250 spread it about, what the church can do for you it can do nothing,
D.251 the Catholics do more everyday in every week than what the
D.252 Protestants do I think it’s disgusting I do really and truly.
D.253 Co: do you–-have you spoken to your vicar or to anyone at church? do -
D.254 they know that you’re infirm?....
(This excerpt continues with materials on the vicar’s/anyone at church’s need and
right to know about the caller’s infirmity.)
Excerpt E
E.415 C1: no, beggars do that, I haven’t become one of them yet (I’ll never
E.416 live to see a beggar’s day, your) prayer, I’d sooner put my head in
E.417 that gas = gas oven, I would (sobs).
E.418 Co: um
E.419 C1: the Jewish people, the Catholic people are all better looked after
E.420 than (me), there’s only one that isn’t that’s Protestants I can tell
E.421 you that, on the phone, I do know that (.... it is) my husband’s
E.422 death, god forbid that I should say such a thing but the (....), no
E.423 charity begins in the church (doesn’t it) (that) my church, what
E.424 they’ve done for me I’m very thankful for, nothing at all.
We can find many elements of Sacks’ work on comparisons (see
above) in the above data sequence, not least the categorial organisation
of this comparison. It shows how the conversational activity of com-
paring is implicated in at least one other activity, that of complaining.
We can see the way in which relevant comparisons are made, i.e. within
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a given conventional collection of categories (“membership categori-
sation device”), in this case the collection “types of religious faith”.
The relevant co-selection of categories for comparison is conducted
according to a generic rule for co-selection, the consistency rule—a
rule that provides both for members’ effectuation and recognition of
such relevance. In short, the hearer’s version of the rule is that i) if
some second membership category is produced proximal to some first
membership category, and ii) if the categories can be heard as coming
from the same membership categorisation device, then iii) hear them
(or make sense of them) that way. Thus, a standard of comparison is
that of categories from the same device,—in our data excerpt, from
“churches”/“types of religious faith”. We see also a treatment of each
church (the Protestants, the Catholics) as what Sacks (, vol. ,
lecture ) refers to as a locus of rights and obligations, in this case
“charity”. We see the comparative ease of membership categories in
the proclamation of what we might term a ‘moral profile’. The norma-
tive imputations that are made on the basis of membership categories
are highly significant and have been attested to since Sacks’ earliest
writings on calls to the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Centre. Deriva-
tively, the role of categorization work in social control activities such
as persuasion can hardly be gainsaid.
Of course we also see that a contrast is introduced through this com-
parative method, where Protestants are made to stand out in contrast
to Catholics (lines D –) and also Jews (lines E –): indeed the
caller herself strongly marks the contrast, (“... there’s only one that
isn’t ...”). In lines – the contrast is set up in terms of the Jewish
people and Catholics meeting a standard that the Protestants fail to
meet. This, then, is a three-category comparison incorporating a third
category contrast, where lines  show a two category contrast but
with the same basis of comparison (types of religious faith/churches).
Given a mutatis mutandis qualification, we see a ‘similar’ two-part con-
trast in the following:
Telephone call to a Crisis Intervention Centre
Excerpt F
F 243 Cl: I have not asked anything, it was a bit of
F244 company I wanted (and) I can’t even have
F245 that in this country, there’s black people
F246 coming into this country and get more than
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F247 what (I), than what white people get, (no
F248 good), I am not against blacks, everybody
F249 has got to live but I’ve never in my life
F250 known how hard it was ... [continues].
Again, we get a basis for comparison from within a given member-
ship categorisation device (race) with a contrast worked up on that
basis. Of course, that operates through the invocation of a different
context than the previous excerpts, where “this country” is invoked—
a duplicatively-organised category where there is an implied contrast
between “recent arrivals” and the “established residents”. Note in
passing there are two items (“I have not asked anything”, “I am not
against blacks”) that work to authorize this account (Smith, ,
p. –) by—perhaps I over-extend Sacks’ term here—protecting it
from induction, or at least cutting off inferences that the caller is ‘ask-
ing for something’ or is being ‘racist’. Such protections can shore up
comparisons and (especially) contrasts (see also Watson, , p. –
, and for a fuller data sequence).
A third example, this time from a police interrogation of a murder
suspect, gives us another type of basis for comparison out of which a
contrast is worked:
Police Interrogation of Murder Suspects
Excerpt G
20 Officer: Well I understand thet uh:: he tried to uh:::::: stay
21 pretty close tih Go:d uh::: by:: singing in the
22 churchiz ’n so forth e n:::uh,
23 ((door squeaking))
24 Suspect: °He’s °He’s a hyp ocrite.°
25 (2.0)
26 Officer: Pard’n?
27 Suspect: He’s a hypocrite.
28 (0.3)
29 Officer: A hypocrite?
30 Suspect: Yes.
31 Suspect: Hypocrites owna sahd a’ God. Dass one thing ah cain’t
32 (see) I am not a hypocrite. .h (1.0) Dey say dey so much
33 diss b’t den then go out (.) outsi:de’n do wro:ng de:n.
34 .h (0.5) o’T’s what they do.o
35 Suspect: But ah:’m not ’f ah don:’t (0.2) believe’n it ah’m
36 nah gon’ (.) try tuh do sump’n (di:vh’rnt). (0.3) Yu-
37 Ah try tuh p- prac (.) preach tih you den you look
38 aroun’n see me doin sump’n else thet ah told you not
39 t’do,
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40 Officer: .t
41 (0.2)
42 Officer: W’l then yer: telling me now thetcher a man’v honor.
43 right?
44 (0.3)




49 Officer: Ah you honorable enough:? (0.7) et this ti:me tuh
50 tell me:, (0.8) what (.) motivatedju?
Here, on lines – we get the police officer’s description of the sus-
pect as “staying pretty close to God by singing in the churches”, thus
making inferentially available a membership category such as “a man
of virtue/honour”. Such an inference is undercut by the suspect who
instead categorises the victim as a “hypocrite”.
Here, we see another comparative basis—a given mode of conduct
is, by inference, used as the base for one inferred category by the officer
and a contrasting one, “hypocrite”, by the suspect. This is worked by
the suspect (lines –) into yet another type of comparative basis for
contrast, that of rightful claim to a given categorisation such as “man
of honour” as opposed to “hypocrite”. This also works on the basis
of an activity contrast between “telling others to do something” to
others and “doing something else ...”—activities which taken together
are bound to the category “hypocrite”. This is a complex case of what
Sacks terms “category-bound activities”, where a given single activity,
e.g. “crying”, is treated by interlocutors as conventionally bound to a
single category “baby” (Sacks, , passim). In our datum, though,
the activities “practicing what one preaches to others” and then “not
doing something else” are only when combined together treatable as
tied to the category “man of honour”—a membership category to
which the suspect affiliates when it is proposed by the officer.
In all these instances we can see ordinary interlocutors as “practical
comparative sociologists”, making comparisons of categories or activ-
ities and working up contrasts on those bases. We have here a remark-
able variety of comparative and, derivatively, contrastive work. In a
sense we can see that these instances are so ‘procedural’ or ‘structural’
(Smith, , p. –) that it can appear formulaic, but the detail
differences are important.
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Two points can be made about this laic comparative and contrastive
work. First, it is not the analyst’s task either to endorse or refute those
comparisons. To do so would be to effectuate a methodologically-
ironic stance, to set up “in competition with” or to assert author-
ity over interlocutors’ laic conceptions. The analyst’s task is, instead,
simply to explicate the procedural (culturally-methodic) bases for the
comparisons made in interlocutors’ verbal utterances. This is the way
in which both CA (and the EM from which it originated) works—
explication, not irony. For instance, there is no warrant in CA or EM
for simply “grounding” a set of analytic comparisons in laic ones: one
can not become a “members’ mouthpiece” (to use Jeff Coulter’s term)
in this or any other way. Instead, CA and EM look at the practical rea-
soning involved in ordinary comparisons and contrasts as these are
expressed and incarnate in, (say): conversational actions. To do oth-
erwise would be to conflate two distinct levels—the laic/ordinary and
the analytic. This, as Schütz pointed out, is a logical error.
Secondly, whilst there are clearly some family resemblances between
the excerpts above, there are also many differences. Some of the con-
trasts are consistency rule-based, but amongst these some work on
the basis of two categories, others on the basis of three. Some work
through activity-descriptions with categories being made inferentially
available and some do not. Some involve disavowals of a givens
category-incumbency and others do not: and so on. Some of the
examples are constituents of an activity such as “complaining” (with
accusatory elements) and others are constituents of self-justifying self-
categorisations, working on claims to incumbency of a category. Such
self-referential work is a frequently-found feature of accounts. Not
least, some of these examples are visibly part of a negotiation for help
whilst others are to do with putative reasons for murdering this partic-
ular victim, a “hypocrite”. Moreover, the context invoked by interlocu-
tors themselves differs: e.g. one categorial claim made by the caller to
the crisis intervention centre works by the invocation of “this country”
as a context, whilst other categorial claims do not rely on this.
Consequently, the procedural equivalences (use of categories, con-
sistency rules, category-bound activities, etc.) between some of the
instances do not stretch to all the instances. Even where there are sim-
ilarities, seeming equivalences at the analytic level, the context differs.
Thus these instances as instances can not, in any straightforward way,
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be aggregated into a single collection. Instead, these instances do not
show a finite number of procedural features which could be used as
definitive analytic criteria for the addition with no further decision of
additional instances for the collection. Consequently, the conditions
for a “mechanical CA” do not here exist. As we shall argue again below,
we can only write of these apparent equivalences if we invoke a mutatis
mutandis rider: we must pay all due attention to detail differences—
differences that count for the interlocutors themselves. Note that a
mutatis mutandis rider does not in CA license the disattending of such
detail differences, let alone the tearing of these claimed equivalences
from their varying orientational contexts. In this respect, any clear-cut
comparison and contrast at the analytic level is beset with difficulties
so complex as to seem, to many, to be intractable. Analytic compari-
son and contrast, whether or not licensed by lay members’ own com-
parisons and contrasts, do not present themselves as possibilities with-
out being vulnerable to some major objections.
It must be said that CA practitioners do take care to elaborate the
detail of each instance, irrespective of its status in a collection, as Her-
itage (, Ch.) observes: and their observations are some of the
most acute and rigorous to be found in social science. However, as Her-
itage (idem, p. ) indicates, such elaboration is ultimately addressed
to the identification of generic procedure, of typicality or reproducibil-
ity, or of some systematic feature—which, of course, apply to more
than the single and singular instance (for another e.g., see Drew, ,
p. , where he writes about the recurrent, systematic aspects of an
extract from a telephone call). This, of course, provides the basis of
and rationale for collections in CA. Despite CA practitioners’ invoca-
tion of context, there remains an “elephant in the room”: the question
that still looms is, “For CA, just how freestanding is conversation?”
To sum up what has been said so far: we can have no objections
to ordinary interlocutors’ own practices of comparison or contrast.
Indeed, our remit is to analyse them as topics. However, the fact that
members compare and contrast does not license CA practitioners to
straightforwardly set up homologous contrasts and comparisons at
the analytic level: and, indeed, Sacks himself, particularly in his lec-
tures on MCD analysis, frequently and even predominantly employed
single instance analysis, though it must be said that there is consider-
able variability here. Sacks, too, often saw his single instances as ‘typ-
MĂeĽrĂcĽiĞ ĂdĂe ŇpĂoŁrĹtĄeĽrĞ ĎlĄeŊŽ ĂcĄoŁrĹrĂeĄcĽtĽiĂoŤnŇŽ ĂàĞ ĎlŸĂeŞnĂcĽrĂe ĹrĂoŁuĞĂgĂe ĹuŠnĹiĂqĹuĂeŞmĂeŞnĹt
PĹrĂaŻxĄeŞmĂaĹtĽiĂqĹuĂe50 — PĹrĂeŞmĹiĂèĽrĂeŊŽ ĂéŊpĹrĂeĽuŠvČeŊŽ — 2010-7-5 — 11 ŘhĞ 08 — ŇpĂaĂgĄe 213 (ŇpĂaĂgĽiŠnĂéĄe 213) ŇsĹuĹrĞ 284
Comparative Sociology, Laic and Analytic 
ical’ or even ‘invariant’—a very strong claim indeed. Sometimes this
refers to a laic conception of ‘typical’ (i.e. interlocutors produce some
categorized person as ‘typical’ of the category), but sometimes he sug-
gests typicality at an analytical level. Thus, his single instance analysis
can operate as a prolegomenon to the making of a collection, perhaps
to be compared with other collections.
Moreover, Sacks’ use of terms such as ‘apparatus’, ‘machinery’ or
even ‘device’ in respect of interlocutors’ methods of speaking together
also suggests that the making of collections might be a next move, e.g.
collections of instances ‘generated’ by the machinery. Sacks proposes
a set of rules in his single instance analysis, rules that ‘reproduce’ his
initial data (Sacks in Hill and Crittenden, , p. –) and it is clear
that these rules, in order to be rules, must be applicable to more than
one case. Of course, as Coulter opines (Coulter, , p. ), Sacks
may be using terms such as ‘apparatus’, ‘reproducible’, etc. as a vivid
metaphor or it may just be that Chomsky’s notion of generativeness
was still in the air at the time, still defined the terms in which language
phenomena were discussed. Nonetheless, the point stands that Sacks’
single instances were often analysed in such a way as to potentiate
collections, comparison and contrasts—ultimately a ‘systematics’, in
fact.
. Comparison as an Analytic Practice in CA
Why, then, do practitioners of CA seek to build collections for the
purpose of analysis? It seems that the answer to this is that formali-
sations are being arrived at and displayed. That is, there is a prefer-
ence for formal generalisations, though attempts at statistical gener-
alisation are not unknown, (viz: Schegloff, ; Heritage and Great-
batch, ). Perhaps a modified version of Cicourel’s arguments on
the procedures involved in the equivalence classing and rate-producing
processes might be the EM “take” on the latter. It is in this area that
we can begin to locate the potentialities and pitfalls of comparison in
CA work. We shall return to this issue below.
In what way has CA aspired to do comparative work as an ana-
lytic commitment rather than just studying comparison as a laic phe-
nomenon? The clearest example takes the form more of an advisory
rather than any substantial delivery, though one may find shadows of
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it in the area of the “Institutional Talk Program (ITP) of CA”. This
is the recommendation of Sacks et al. (, and in Schenkein, ,
p. –): that CA take on the comparative study of speech exchange
systems. As Sacks et al. put it regarding the envisaged trajectory of
CA:
suffices to suggest a structural possibility: that turn-taking systems, at
least the class of them whose members each preserve ‘one party talks
at a time’ are, with respect to their allocational arrangements linearly
arranged. The linear array is one in which one polar type (which con-
versation instances) involves ‘one turn at a time allocation’; that is,
the use of local allocational means, and the other pole (which debates
instance) involves ‘preallocation of all turns’ and medial types (which
meetings instance) involve various mixes of preallocational and local
allocational means.
That the types can be so arranged permits them to be compared
directly, in relevant functional terms. Thus, one pole (local allocation
of turns) permits maximization of the size of the set of potential speak-
ers to each turn, . . . whereas the other (preallocation of all turns) is
designed to permit the equalization of turns . . . which it does by spec-
ifying . . . next speaker. (Sacks et al., : p. .)
It is very clear from the above quotation that the authors are propos-
ing a comparative method, one which refers to analysts’, not necessar-
ily members’ work of comparison per se. Nowhere in the section on
the comparative study of speech exchange systems is members’ laic
comparative work even mentioned: no wonder, since one does not
routinely hear or observe members organising two or more speech
exchange systems into a “linear array” or continuum. What we have
instead is a set of analytic terms and criteria for the comparison of
speech exchange systems without any direct reference to members’
own intersubjective conceptions of any such comparison or criterion.
Thus, there are two modalities for comparative work in CA. The
first is the study of comparison as a lay members’ conception and
practice. The second is the study of comparison as an analysts’ concep-
tion and practice without an explicit, central concern for laic compar-
isons. This is sometimes done in an unannounced manner, viz Scheglof-
f ’s often implicitly comparative approach to data instances (Schegloff,
). The remainder of this article will argue that, of course, the CA
researcher has every reason to take seriously as a topic members’ laic
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comparative work but that the comparative study of speech exchange
systems conceived as a purely analytic exercise is a questionable one.
Some possible resolutions to such problems will,—highly tentatively—
be proffered: however, we must first work towards them, both diagnos-
tically and therapeutically.
. Methodological Issues in CA’s Use of Comparison as an
Analytic Practice
The very first, and from an EM point of view, highly positive
thing to observe about CA’s use of comparisons as an analytic
practice is that it refuses the usual conceptual devices that sociolo-
gists use to draw comparisons. For instance, Weberians’ use of ideal
types is clearly subject to the strictures Sacks adduced in his paper
‘Notes on Methodology’ concerning what he called “hypotheticalised-
typicalised models” of social action (Sacks, in Atkinson and Her-
itage, ). Not only do these models comprise analytic imposi-
tions on the data but also, as Sacks claims, they are in no wise
descriptively adequate to their object. As Atkinson and Heritage say,
(: p. –) such models might well lead to artifactual characterisa-
tions and conclusions based on—and here I quote—“intuitive idiosyn-
crasy, selective attention or recollection, or experimental design”. The
use of naturally-occurring, tape/video-recorded data is recommended
instead: and these data are the very basis of CA analytic practice, pro-
viding for subsequent comparative and other analytic operations, usu-
ally transcript-based too.
An initial question, then, is this: given that intuitive or imagined
data instances and analyses are renounced (although still sometimes
used) by CA, and that natural data are then preferred in order to char-
acterise and analyse social (in this case, conversational) actions, how
does the making of collections get to be done? How does a series of
natural data instances come to be produced as a “recognisable collec-
tion”? How many instances is enough? It seems clear that the activity
of equivalence classing is going on: the collections are seen in prepo-
sitional form—collections of something (e.g. of repair). Comparison,
then, is involved in the most basic sense in the initial assembling of a
collection (“instance one can be compared with instance two”), as well
as the collection itself coming to be used for subsequent comparisons.
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Very often (though not of course always), the collections in the pub-
lished research literature in CA are of the kind n=. Only two cases of
the class are presented, though we are apparently sometimes meant to
infer that they are only two (presumably perspicuous) representatives
of a larger collection held by someone, somewhere, or that they express
a ‘systematics’ for a very large number of instances. We might say that
a collection of two data instances suffices (this is reminiscent of Sacks’
remark to the effect that one is an instance, two is a series), though
of course the number can be proliferated. It is notable that collections
are subjected to “instructed readings”, though of course such readings
are not restricted to collections. Those readings may involve section
introductions, e.g. Schegloff et al.’s lead-in to a two-item collection in
their canonical paper on the normative preference for self-correction,
i.e. (Schegloff et al., : section .).
Section .: “As noted above, the Y’ mean X? form may be used to
modulate an other-correction. But it may be used, quite apart from
that, to check understanding, i.e. for a check by recipient-of-a-turn of
his understanding of the turn—as can forms other than Y’ mean X?
E.g., (continues).”
This passage is immediately followed by a presentation of and by a
two-paragraph explication of the two instances: and, again, n=.
It is interesting that Schegloff et al. explicitly present the common-
alities as “forms” and, indeed, we shall return very shortly to CA’s
methodological emphasis on forms. For the moment, however, let
us arrive at a conception of collections, which form the basis of so
much comparison in CA: we refer here both to intra-collection inter-
collection comparisons. Again, the Schegloff et al. paper on conversa-
tional repair comprises a classic example: intra-collection comparison
of three different positions for self-initiations and inter-collection com-
parison of self- and other-initiated repairs: of course, intra-collection
comparisons can yield sub-comparisons (viz Schegloff et al, , sec-
tion ).
A collection might, then, be referred to as (i) at least two (tran-
scribed) empirical instances, adjacently or proximally arranged, and
(ii) the “lived work” of collecting, in this case the textual work of
describing the collection and the work of comparison, i.e. identi-
fying the similarities and differences between the instances. A col-
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lection, then, is not just a set of instances tout court. Indeed, fol-
lowing Garfinkel and Sacks (), we may refer to the instances
as the “accountable texts” for which the surrounding textual expli-
cation furnishes the account, provides for an instructed reading of
the instances taken together: indeed, the account provides for what
“together” might mean in the first place so far as these instances are
concerned. This lived work thus constitutes the collection as a collec-
tion, as an equivalence class of isomorphs or partaking of isomorphic
properties.
Of course, we also need to look at CA actual methodology, its
‘logic—in—use (Kaplan, L, , p. –) not least that of transcrip-
tion practices, worksite practices through which the data instances, sev-
erally and together, are initially furnished and are transformed from
the primary data-site, the audio or video- recording. CA analysts often
work by preference from these primary sites, but, often, all that we
have in printed media such as journals or even in online journals are
the transcribed transformations. There, the transcripts stand as ‘the
data’, though Garfinkel has described them as ‘docile texts’ when com-
pared to the witnessably lived work of the primary field. One might
suggest that the methodological project can be characterised as the
production of formal statements from these data sources, or perhaps
of sociological descriptions of conversational forms. As the philoso-
pher Per Segerdahl (: p. –) claims in a perceptive, if some-
times off-target, critique of CA’s theoretical basis:
A conversation analysis, such as the analysis of turn-taking performed
by Sacks et al. is characteristically a formal analysis of features of
sequentially represented conversations. This draws conversation ana-
lysis nearer to linguistic disciplines such as formal semantics and prag-
matics. The claims attached to formal analysis are, however, different
from those of formal semantics and pragmatics. Under the influence
of ethnomethodology, a formal analysis is not conceived of as a theo-
retical model of the underlying nature of a phenomenon—recall Gar-
finkel’s conception that there is an inevitable gap between theory and
phenomenon—but as a description of empirically-found formal pro-
cedures that conversationalists employ to produce conversations, and
to recognize, and display their understanding of, organizational fea-
. Here I draw upon Eric Livingston’s most suggestive analysis of textual and other
kinds of lived work in his books An Anthropology of Reading and The Ethnomethod-
ological Foundations of Mathematics.
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tures of conversations, for instance, that a particular conversationalist
ought to speak but is silent.
His claim accords, in the main, with that of Garfinkel and Sacks’
back in the days when EM and CA were not so sharply differenti-
ated (Garfinkel and Sacks, : p. , reproduced in Garfinkel ,
p. ):
Ethnomethodological studies of formal structures are directed to the
study of such phenomena, seeking to describe members’ accounts of
formal structures wherever and by whomever they are done. . . .
The comparative establishing of equivalence and difference are very
much part of this project of formalisation, or at least the project of
describing forms. In principle if not always in practice, CA involves
one strand of formal analysis, that of a phenomenological rather than
a neo-Kantian sort. There is a stress on the accountability of formal
properties to members, to formal properties as phenomena for mem-
bers. The former can be elucidated through the work of Gurwitsch.
This kind of formalism is to be distinguished from the neo-Kantian
kind such as that of Simmel, with his “form”-“content” distinction
and an implied or incipient distinction between the phenomenon as
apperceived and the thing in itself.
The similarities and differences fielded by comparative analysis in
CA are, then, done through formal analysis in the elemental sense that
they comprise forms, e.g. self-versus other-initiated repairs, self-versus
other-repair outcomes, etc. This is definitely not to accuse CA analysts
of producing crude overviews or overweening rubrics. As Segerdahl
vividly puts it (ibid., p. ), with reference to Sacks’ formal analysis
of membership categorisation:
The spirit that Sacks emphasizes is not that of a thick-skinned logi-
cian led away from the concrete world by fascination of the abstract
subtleties of a formal calculus, but that of a highly sensitive scholar
who is able to get on the fine track of a shy animal.
Would that this analytic mentality were more consistently in evi-
dence in much contemporary CA. Our question concerning formal
. On this distinction, see D. Martindale (), p. –, – and passim.
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analysis becomes: through what moves is such a formal analysis pro-
duced by the CA researcher? If we can answer this we might be able
to see the problem with CA as a formal project (of which comparative
analysis is part).
. Some Major Reservations about the Difficulties of
Comparison in CA
There is something of an ambivalence at the heart of the CA project.
CA is interesting and important in its conception of contextualising
instruments in conversation (membership analysis, circumstance anal-
ysis, recipient design, etc.) but CA practitioners’ wish to arrive at a
formal analysis, i.e. an analysis which identifies the forms these instru-
ments take, leads them into a curious position, one which bears a
few resemblances to Dorothy Smith’s () “three tricks” of analytic
extraction, decontextualisation and re-contextualisation. These are (in
my admittedly selective précis): i) separate what people say they think
from the actual circumstances in which it is said, ii) rearrange those
ideas and iii) constitute them as a distinct entity (say, ‘systematics’).
In their synoptic article of early CA, Sacks et al. ( and in
Schenkein, , p. –) verge on some of these analytic “tricks”.
Hence:
Reason began to appear for taking seriously the possibility that a cha-
racterization of turn-taking for conversation could be developed that
would have the important twin features of being context-free and also
capable of extraordinary context-sensitivity. . . .
First of all, a problem for research is that conversation is always ‘si-
tuated’, always comes out of, and is part of, some real sets of circum-
stances of its participants. But there are various reasons why one does
not want to have to know or characterize such situations for particu-
lar conversations in order to investigate them. And the question then
becomes: What might be extracted as ordered phenomena from our
conversational materials which would not turn out to require reference
to one or other aspect of situatedness, identities, and particularities of
content or context.
It seems an odd position that one has to decontextualise in order
to study contextualisation. Sacks et al. furnish plausible reasons for
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this analytic election, but a major reason to which they do not explic-
itly refer is that this procedure of lifting conversational organisation
out of the distinctive and specific circumstances of its use on particu-
lar occasions, out of its particular phenomenal field—and, as a con-
sequence, downplaying its content too—operates as a “machinery for
creating formalisations”. The “rearrangement” referred to by Smith
then works in the case of CA as extracting and selectively focusing
(e.g. in transcripts) on sequential features of conversational organisa-
tion. This, in turn, provides for a “rearrangement” such as the mak-
ing of collections where each “similar” instance is shorn of the gestalt
contexture which comprised its provenance so that it can be aggre-
gated with other instances similarly treated and inspected largely for
sequence. Thus, a first step in formalisation can lead to a second step—
the arrival at formalisations that emerge from considering the collec-
tion of instances “as a whole”. The operations of comparison and con-
trast, of establishing equivalence, variation and difference take place
within that nexus of formalisation. Of course, other analysts of nat-
ural language use may vary in their orientation to the centrality of
formalism and to its intersubjective status, but those practising ‘high
church’ CA seem to have explicitly espoused formalism from the ear-
liest times, as I have indicated above—hence their conceptual vocabu-
lary items such as ‘apparatus’ and ‘systematics’. (I am not inclined to
be so indulgent as Coulter concerning CA’s intent in using these terms).
This being the case, we can interrogate the intersubjective status of the
formal properties adduced.
The similarities and differences that are, variously, the condition
for and/or the outcome of comparative analyses are, then, formal
ones established across a range of substantive materials raised from
their distinctively-identifying in vivo contexts and qualified through a
mutatis mutandis rider. Put this way, the pristine naturalism of CA
as described by Atkinson and Heritage in their quotation cited above
(p. ) seems more artefactual than it first appears.
Zimmerman (: p. ; also cited in Lynch and Bogen, :
p. , with whose arguments my own bears significant points of con-
tact) expresses very honestly and well the role of comparison in CA
relative to the making of collections of recorded, transcribed natural
data:
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To be sure, initial purchase on some phenomena may be gained on
intuitive grounds, but this is merely the beginning. From this point
on, the phenomenon is ‘worked up’ by searching across many conver-
sations, resulting in increasing empirical control and a more general
understanding of the process that generates it. When applied to new
cases (which, of course, could undercut the formulation and force its
revision) such empirically grounded formulations furnish a warrant
for the identification of particular conversational events. Indeed, the
cumulative results of conversation analytic research should permit a
defailed understanding of particular, singular conversations.
This quotation is notable because CA practitioners’ explicit refer-
ence to how their analytic collections are made are very rare (and we
may wonder why). Zimmerman’s quotation also aptly identifies the
data-gathering/analytic procedure followed by CA practitioners, and
the role of data collections in that procedure. However, it also, perhaps
unwittingly, identifies the pitfalls involved for at least a pristine CA in
following a collection-based or comparative procedure. This is that
the cumulative—we might say emergent—properties of the collection
“as a whole”, as analytically established, are not only used to charac-
terise each member of the collection but are also used to approach
the characterisation of some new data instance that is being consid-
ered as a candidate for the collection. This is equivalence classing, full-
blooded, à la Kaplan. Perhaps, even, it constitutes a move, however
slight, towards what is now called ‘toy models’ of the ‘just so’ kind.
Plainly, not only are there pitfalls in this “absorptive” analytic use of
collections, but also there are fundamental problems involving mem-
bers’ laic, in situ, in vivo designations of an instance of speech exchange
as opposed to the technical designations of that instance effectuated by
professional practitioners of CA. Indeed the notion of a (formalistic)
‘systematics’ is a case in point. We should note that the idea of a ‘sys-
tematics’ of social action has been an ideal of FA sociology for most
of the last century; von Wiese and Becker set out a protocol for “the
systematics of action patterns”, focalizing linguistic actions, back in
 (v. Wiese and Becker, p. – and Part ).
Some of those pitfalls and problems can merely be sketched here.
The overall problem seems to be the conflation of members’ and ana-
lysts’ standpoint on each data instance. Put more specifically, the lat-
ter comes to stand for the former. That is, members’ orientations
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are more or less displaced, to be replaced by those of the CA prac-
titioner. There is a clear danger of analytic stipulativeness and impo-
sition here, but there is also a deep intellectual confusion. Not least,
all this imputes a rather flat stylistic unity to CA,—a “monochrome
plain”, we might say—where each study tends to have an insistently
similar pattern to every other, such that variant forms of the analysis,
(for instance, where studies indicate that conversational organisation
owes its nature to something in addition to sequence on a given occa-
sion), are not afforded corpus status: only canonical sequential analy-
ses will be admitted to the fastness that is CA.
Even ‘deviant case analysis’ is, ultimately, not to the single instance
approach that it seems to merit. Schegloff ’s () canonical and
indeed inventive analysis of a single deviant case amongst approxi-
mately  others ended up in the absorption of that case with the
other  and into a single analytically-described equivalence class,
that of summons-answer sequences.
What we get, then, is a situation where the emergent properties
of collections, as derived by professional analysts, tend to come to
stand on behalf of lay speakers’ own in vivo, in situ orientations to
each case. As Lynch and Bogen point out, (Lynch and Bogen, :
p. –, –), what has evolved from this is a corpus of properties
that forms part of a professionalised, scientistic culture of analysis:
they are speaking here of scientism, not science. This culture is where
the natural accountability of a phenomenon is subsumed under, even
supplanted by, an increasingly aprioristic technicised characterisation
based on a corpus of precedents, i.e. prior findings that are part of the
working culture of CA,—and, particularly, perhaps, of those CA prac-
titioners who work within what some call the ITP; the ‘Institutional
Talk Programme’ in CA. For some observations on this, see Lynch
and Bogen (, p. ff.). Thus, a set of precedents may be drawn on
from this culture in order to furnish the practical meaning of some
currently-considered sequence(s). Of course, such considerations yet
again take us into the domain of CA as a worksite practice.
Transcription practices at the workface comprise a particular focus,
though there has been relatively little analytic attention paid to the
transcribing process and even less to transcript reading. Transcript
reading contains rules of use such as ‘/’ for silence. The rule provides
that the symbol stands unquestioned—it directs the reader to the ref-
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erent: the sign does not simply stand for (the bounding of) a silence
but constitutes that object, (this point is my re-working of Pack ,
p. –).
In turn, the phenomenological conception of formalism comes to
recede somewhat in favour of the neo-Kantian one, with all its atten-
dant problems. Chief among these, as indicated above is the intersub-
jectively problematic status of the actual formal properties that are
adduced—clearly a problem for any form of CA that recognises any
remaining resonance with its EM roots. This does not mean that CA
becomes another example of classical sociology—that would be going
much too far—but it does mean that in some cases it incorporates
some of the conceptual (an element of neo-Kantianism) and method-
ological devices (e.g. quantitative techniques) that characterise some
classical sociologies. This might, at the very least, be said to introduce
disjunctive elements into CA practice.
It was not always thus,—at least, not to such an extent. Though,
as I have observed, the seeds of the current situation were always
present in CA, especially from  onwards, CA at one time was less
impervious to the conception of conversational organisation as inter-
subjectively available from the commonsense standpoint of the ordi-
nary person,—so much so that CA was seen by some, even as late as
, as revealing (again) the “architecture of intersubjectivity” (viz:
Heritage, : p. ). CA was seen as a topic, referring to ordinary
speakers’ ongoing analysis of the conversations in which they were
involved. As Schegloff and Sacks put it a decade previously, there was
a laic intersubjective warrant for the identification of a turn at talk,
and this warrant was revealed by “next action analysis” in CA. This
is particularly marked in the case of adjacency pairing of utterances,
i.e. in utterance types that are conventionally paired such as question-
answer, invitation-acceptance/declination, etc. This is how Schegloff
and Sacks, in an impressive paper (Schegloff and Sacks : p. ),
exhaustively define the intersubjective warrant as operating with refer-
ence to such adjacency pairs.
What two utterances, produced by different speakers, can do that one
utterance can not do is: by an adjacently positioned second, a speaker
can show that he understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is
willing to go along with that. Also, by virtue of the occurrence of an
adjacently produced second, the doer of a first can see that what he
MĂeĽrĂcĽiĞ ĂdĂe ŇpĂoŁrĹtĄeĽrĞ ĎlĄeŊŽ ĂcĄoŁrĹrĂeĄcĽtĽiĂoŤnŇŽ ĂàĞ ĎlŸĂeŞnĂcĽrĂe ĹrĂoŁuĞĂgĂe ĹuŠnĹiĂqĹuĂeŞmĂeŞnĹt
PĹrĂaŻxĄeŞmĂaĹtĽiĂqĹuĂe50 — PĹrĂeŞmĹiĂèĽrĂeŊŽ ĂéŊpĹrĂeĽuŠvČeŊŽ — 2010-7-5 — 11 ŘhĞ 08 — ŇpĂaĂgĄe 224 (ŇpĂaĂgĽiŠnĂéĄe 224) ŇsĹuĹrĞ 284
 Cahiers de praxématique , 
intended was indeed understood, and that it was or was not accepted.
Also, of course, a second can assert his failure to understand, or disa-
greement, and, inspection of a second can allow the first speaker to
see that while the second thought he understood, indeed he misunders-
tood. . . . Wherever then there is some reason to have the appreciation
of some implicativeness to be made attendable, ‘next utterance’ is the
proper place to do that. . . .
Here, we can see how “next utterance” is crucial in “intersubjective
alignment”,—that is, the identification and checking by the interlocu-
tors themselves from within the same utterance sequence in the same
conversation—of the specific, putatively shared, sense of the first utter-
ance. (“Sense”, here, consists in what that first utterance was specif-
ically doing, as a conversational action—again, the “what” and the
“how” coincide.)
The Schegloff and Sacks quotation also shows how specific intersub-
jective alignment is a jointly-achieved matter, done through the “fine
tuning” of conversational activities, reciprocally done. Whilst the quo-
tation adopts a formal approach, the formalism involved is, clearly,
sensitively attuned to co-conversationalists’ activities with regard to
a given sequence. Thus, whilst a question may be identifiable as such
through its interrogative format, intonation contour, etc., one intersub-
jective warrant for its being a question (rather than, e.g., an invitation)
is that it is recognised, i.e. treated as such in the immediately succeed-
ing utterance. This kind of consideration is why the title “Conversa-
tion(al) Analysis” was devised. It was initially intended as designating
a topic for analysis rather than, say, a professionalised research tech-
nique. “CA” designated lay interlocutors’ own commonsense analysis
of the conversation in which they were involved, moment-to-moment.
It is, I feel, no accident that contemporary CA has gradually backed
off from insisting on ’next action analysis.
. Of course we must issue the caveat that, in another strand, the Schegloff and
Sacks’ quotation may indeed be taken in general terms, terms which do provide for
the making of collections.
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. Implications for Professional Conversation-Analytic
Practice
What, then, is to be done about CA with regard to comparison? Can
the practitioner continue to partly or wholly derive the meaning or spe-
cific sense of given utterance sequences through a comparison with a)
prior, putatively “similar”, instances, or b) fellow instances in a cur-
rent collection? Or do we need to re-specify CA in order to maximally
capitalise on its parallel tendency—most evident in earlier studies and
in Sacks’ lectures (Sacks, )—towards locating meaning as interior
to the particular interactional sequence under consideration?
If we choose the latter,—and I propose that we do—we tend to
move away from an analytic warrant for a particular imputation of
sense toward a topicalising of the laic production of sense entirely
from within a given sequence. This would serve to re-position CA
away from one tendency, i.e. where analysts, partly on the compar-
ative basis of precedent and other general considerations, arrogate
the meaning of an utterance, toward another tendency, that of focal-
ising interlocutors’ own in situ, in vivo sense-production activities as
deployed within a particular sequence in its distinctive phenomenal
field. The latter option would move toward an emphasis on the exam-
ination of single, indeed singular, instances and of starting again with
each instance rather than drawing one’s analysis from some precedent
or some collection—which operation surely involves the importation
and imposition of what Garfinkel has called an “external standard”, a
set of “meanings” that are exogenous to the specific, distinctive activi-
ties and singular setting currently under consideration. After all, falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus, as the legal phrase has it.
If we choose the former option, which maximises rather than min-
imises collecting and comparative operations, we are condemned to
repeat the approach of the more orthodox formalistic sociologies and
much of linguistics. That approach involves the analyst setting up
him/herself in competition with ordinary speakers’ displayed orienta-
tions in any particular situation of speech exchange. Of course, there
may be rich temptations for those practitioners originally trained in
orthodox sociology or linguistics to attempt to absorb CA into their
“mainstream” analytic rubrics: but this would lead to the dissolution
of CA’s distinctive contribution, and would reinstate just those ana-
MĂeĽrĂcĽiĞ ĂdĂe ŇpĂoŁrĹtĄeĽrĞ ĎlĄeŊŽ ĂcĄoŁrĹrĂeĄcĽtĽiĂoŤnŇŽ ĂàĞ ĎlŸĂeŞnĂcĽrĂe ĹrĂoŁuĞĂgĂe ĹuŠnĹiĂqĹuĂeŞmĂeŞnĹt
PĹrĂaŻxĄeŞmĂaĹtĽiĂqĹuĂe50 — PĹrĂeŞmĹiĂèĽrĂeŊŽ ĂéŊpĹrĂeĽuŠvČeŊŽ — 2010-7-5 — 11 ŘhĞ 08 — ŇpĂaĂgĄe 226 (ŇpĂaĂgĽiŠnĂéĄe 226) ŇsĹuĹrĞ 284
 Cahiers de praxématique , 
lytic problems that CA was devised to resolve or to occlude.
What, then, might we propose, however tentatively, as a way of
re-working CA so as to avoid some of the problems concerning
collections—and, we might add, to the incipient scientism in CA prac-
titioners’ language in referring to and using collections? One way
might be to respecify the notion of “collection”, to treat it as, at bot-
tom, a natural language term indexing—or, better, glossing—a contex-
tually variable range of characteristics rather than indicating one or
more “across the board” finite, criterial features. In other words, we
might treat the term “collection” in the same way as Wittgenstein in
his later work (: paragraphs e and e) treats that of “game”:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean
board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games. What is com-
mon to them all?—Don’t say: “There must be something common, or
they would not be called ‘games’”—but look and see whether there is
anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a
whole series of them at that. . . . Look for example at board games
with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card games; here
you will find many correspondences with the first group, but many
common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass to ball
games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they
all “amusing”? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there
always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of
patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child
throws his ball at a wall and catches it again, this feature has disap-
peared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the diffe-
rence between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games
like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how
many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go
through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; and
see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this exa-
mination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping
and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similari-
ties of detail. (Wittgenstein, : paras e and e)
Consequently, we may treat some first instance of what CA prac-
titioners identify as a collection as having a range of properties that
vary from, but (on the basis of contextual variation), overlap with
those of some second instance, which then again departs from some
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third instance but also retains some overlaps: and so on. We might
observe that in our respecified definition of “collection” (a set of col-
lected instances + the lived textual work of collecting) we do see some-
thing approaching such provision, given that much of the textual work
of collecting involves a mutatis mutandis rider—that these instances
comprise “a-collection-given-due-attention-to detail-differences” and
given the “forms of life” limitation (see below). I simply propose that
this de facto practice become an explicitly de jure one. In a strong sense,
though, the family resemblance model works better for the analysis of
descriptive terms such as “membership categorisation” (viz: indirectly
Heritage, : p. –).
In this respect, we might now locate comparison (e.g. intra-collection
comparison) in CA within a “family resemblance” model. However,
there remains what is at least an open question, that of intersubjec-
tive transitivity. To wit: does this model avoid the problems to which
we referred above, those involved in the “carrying over” of the spe-
cific, contextually-based intersubjective orientations that constitute
one given instance into a characterisation of the next? This is the core
problem of comparison in CA. It is far from certain whether collec-
tions of, say, sequences can be analytically respecified in this way.
As indicated above, the only way to move toward securing the “sub-
jective adequacy”, as Weber put it, of the analysis is to produce a rad-
ically respecified version of Schegloff ’s single instance analysis, one
which does not involve residual comparisons. This, of course, also
involves respecification of CA in toto, and rather than simply re-
jigging the “analytic technology” of CA, in a limited way, seems to
involve a radical reorientation of the “analytic mentality” of CA, a
letting go of what Wittgenstein, writing of philosophers, dubbed “the
attitude of disdain toward the particular case”.
Such a respecification involves a major initial move, and that is to
reverse the policy that Sacks et al. propose in their “Simplest System-
atics” article, quoted on infra. That policy is to lift the “apparatus” of
conversation out of its occasioning context, to extract it from the par-
ticular set of very specific contextual relevances of which it is part—
including features such as participants’ contextual orientations to a
given task, a contextually-embedded project of action, or one of a vast
array of gestalt contexture-based considerations, e.g. collaborative
working at a computer work-station. It is entirely conceivable that the
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talk will have a variety of bearings on different gestalt contextures—
including various degrees of centrality to the context, e.g. as Michael
Lynch has observed, talk at the science laboratory bench is often nei-
ther central nor pervasive. We might observe that talk may well on
occasion be shaped quite as much by locally-specific, distinctively-
identifying gestalt contexture considerations as by the turn-taking or
categorial ones, (see, e.g., Greiffenhagen and Watson, , for some
indicatory arguments and instance-by-instance findings relating to col-
laboration at a computer: here, the hope and attempt was also to make
some initial moves in a single instance analysis of data that were at
least recognizable to practitioners of CA).
The same applies to the comparative analysis of the formal speech
exchange systems studied under the aegis of the ITP of CA. To remove
talk from its legal or medical, or pedagogic or other conventionally-
given purposes, motives, understandings or tasks—specific knowl-
edges, purposes, motives, understandings or tasks that are embedded
in the vast range of particular and distinctive worksite contexts of each
of those institutional practices—is putatively to remove from consid-
eration one major shaping element of the talk. Indeed, that shaping
element may be variably operative within the range of settings com-
prising a given institution. As for inter-institutional comparisons of
speech exchange systems, the shaping elements are located in very dif-
ferent “forms of life”, to use Wittgenstein’s term (Winch, , p. –
). Included under the aegis of this term are the distinctive contexts,
different complexes of conventions and rules, different constellations
of concepts, different knowledges, different informal practices, distinc-
tive ways of making professional sense—contextual sense—that per-
tain amongst different institutions such as religion, sciences, law. These
institutional differences make the ‘across the board’ criteria for com-
parison highly problematic. Indeed, any form of analytic transitivity
and transposition risk incoherence or logical disjunction. The Wittgen-
steinian game analogy not only gives EM and CA practitioners alike
a possible way forward (subject to the ‘form of life’ caveat) but can
also afford us a basis for a critique of formal equivalence classing in
CA. Consider the term ‘run’ as a unit of scoring: the term ‘run’ is
used in at least three sports—cricket, baseball and rounders. The term
‘run’ seems to be an equivalence class operating across three sports.
However, a run in cricket has a very different sense from that in base-
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ball, a sense that is located in the distinctive complex of rules, conven-
tions and moves in each game. A ‘run’ in rounders is closer to that
of baseball but still differs in sense or meaning given the differing (if
overlapping) rule-sets of the games. Thus, the term ‘run’ is, in other
games, sometimes closer in its meaning or sense to that in baseball,
sometimes further away but is never coterminous with it. To say that
a ‘run’ in each of these games is an isomorph that can be collected
with ‘runs’ from the other games into a single equivalence class, is
observationally radically misleading, and amounts to what Ryle ()
calls a ‘category-mistake’—an error of logical category. To effectuate
a comparison between different forms of ordinary talk would be to
ride roughshod over these forms of life, to forcibly conflate and con-
fuse them, to wrest these talk-shaping elements from the distinctive
conventional-institutional context that informs them. Often a rather
behaviouristic formalism is the only way these contextual matters can
be disattended. This “slippage” between different forms of life leads
to the kind of logical disjunctions and confusions that Winch (,
) so rigorously and profoundly exposes.
A somewhat parallel argument applies to the usual comparison in
this domain, namely the comparison between “ordinary”—or “natu-
ral” conversation (that is, locally allocated not pre-allocated turn orga-
nization) and some form of (pre-allocated) institutional talk. The lat-
ter involves a complex of orientations and control procedures that do
not pertain in ordinary conversation. In some worksites, talk itself may
not be so central to the work, to task-performance and the like, see
again Lynch ().
Of course, this approach requires a respecification of the central
policies and methods of CA, and this respecification would serve to
reunite it with Harold Garfinkel’s recent EM—not his Studies in Eth-
nomethodology so much as his Ethnomethodology’s Program: Respec-
ifying Durkheim’s Aphorism, (). EM too would profit from this
reunion and would be able to evolve accordingly, especially on linguis-
tic matters. This later study is cast in terms of Gurwitsch’s notion of
gestalt contexture far more than is the earlier one. It might be sug-
gested that the re-emplacement of conversational organisation, conver-
sational instruments, etc. within an array of orientations constituting
a particular gestalt contexture would abolish the problems of compar-
ison in canonical CA that we have discussed above—problems that
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Schegloff ’s “single instance analysis” does not fully occlude. Such an
approach would maximise our profit from the highly sensitive analytic
mentality that, as Segerdahl observed, characterised Sacks’ own pio-
neering approach and which still has echoes in some contemporary
CA.
. Conclusion and Implications
The main thrust of this brief paper has been to argue that the equiv-
alence classing that seems to inform CA practitioners’ assembling of
collections of data instances is misconceived. It involves lifting a data
instance from its context, which following long-established EM prac-
tice I have called a gestalt contexture, and bringing it into an equiv-
alence relationship with other data instances torn from other, poten-
tially very different, contextures.
Tellingly, the concept of gestalt contexture has never been employed
in CA, despite many discussions of context in that area. Perhaps this
is not surprising since no naturalistic discipline cognate with CA in
analysing communicative interactions uses this conception of context
either. For instance, a canonical and otherwise immensely useful col-
lection of papers on language and context, Duranti and Goodwin’s
edited volume Rethinking Context (), contains, to the best of my
knowledge, not a single substantive reference to gestalt contexture in
over  close-printed pages.
The term ‘gestalt contexture’ perhaps affords us the most phenomen-
ologically-sensitive, the most intersubjectively-adequate conception
of context. In early EM it was often linked with the ‘documentary
method of interpretation’ as a model of the back-and-forth determi-
nation of an array of indexical particulars and an imputed underlying
pattern (see Wieder’s  study of language in the subcultural con-
text of a parole institution, p. –). This way of conceptualising
the reflexive constitution of pattern and particular was later dropped
by Garfinkel and he reconceptualized it in a way that accorded more
closely with Aron Gurwitsch’s conception (Garfinkel, , p.  and
passim), though it was still very much Garfinkel’s development of that
conception.
There is no room in this article to elaborate the extensiveness and
subtlety of the concept ‘gestalt contexture’ nor to do more than merely
MĂeĽrĂcĽiĞ ĂdĂe ŇpĂoŁrĹtĄeĽrĞ ĎlĄeŊŽ ĂcĄoŁrĹrĂeĄcĽtĽiĂoŤnŇŽ ĂàĞ ĎlŸĂeŞnĂcĽrĂe ĹrĂoŁuĞĂgĂe ĹuŠnĹiĂqĹuĂeŞmĂeŞnĹt
PĹrĂaŻxĄeŞmĂaĹtĽiĂqĹuĂe50 — PĹrĂeŞmĹiĂèĽrĂeŊŽ ĂéŊpĹrĂeĽuŠvČeŊŽ — 2010-7-5 — 11 ŘhĞ 08 — ŇpĂaĂgĄe 231 (ŇpĂaĂgĽiŠnĂéĄe 231) ŇsĹuĹrĞ 284
Comparative Sociology, Laic and Analytic 
assert its centrality to EM. Suffice it here to say that it refers, in
Garfinkel’s “take” on Gurwitsch, to the distinctively-identifying in
vivo phenomenal detail composing just this setting and no other, here
and now, just this particular phenomenal field. Each phenomenal
detail at once gains its sense from its affiliation with a texture of other
detail and lends its sense to them: and this sense emerges, develops and
transforms over a texture-specific durée as endogenously apperceived
by participants. Such a contexture may encompass items of specialised
knowledge, specific motivations or norms, as well as the more obvious
‘contextual’ features. We may then talk of a particular conversation’s
reflexive embedding in its distinctive phenomenal field detail.
The point about a gestalt contexture is its distinctiveness: each spe-
cific phenomenal field is composed of a distinctively-identifying array
of phenomenological detail, much in the way that a kaleidoscope fur-
nishes a new, distinctive pattern after each shake. To lift an item of
talk-in-interaction from such a distinctively-identifying phenomenal
field is to remove it from what Garfinkel and Gurwitsch might term
its very specific functional signification. To be sure, this may wrest an
item of talk-in-interaction from some features of the very interaction
in which it is involved. The item of talk comprises a move within that
particular phenomenal field, just there and then, and to lift it from
that field is to dissolve its sense as just that move, as a move-within-
this-specific field (where, reflexively, the specific field gains meaning
from the move, too).
Wieder’s use of the notion of gestalt contexture in relation to utter-
ances comprising ‘expressions’ of a context (the ‘context’ being, in
part, the inmates’ “code” of resistance) is nicely formulated in the fol-
lowing quotation (Wieder, , p. )
The utterances and behaviours upon which the code (or any other nor-
mative order) is based have no self-evident or self-explanatory sense
in isolation from one another. Instead, they have a relatively definite
sense as constituent parts of an actually witnessed, concrete setting in
the way that each is a constituent within a system of functional signifi-
cances. That is, situations, actions, and rules determine one another’s
sense as constituent parts of a Gestalt-contexture.
Following through on this quotation Jeff Coulter (: p. ) adds
of texts (in which we may include oral-aural texts):
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Texts’ self-explicating features are, inter alia, functions of their exhibi-
ted ‘respect for’ the gestalt-contexted character of the human activities,
circumstances, objects and products they conceptualize.
To this we might add, somewhat laterally, that the self-explicating fea-
tures of utterances, sequences or a conversation of what Garfinkel
and Sacks, (, p. ff.) call a ‘self-explicating colloquy’ also expli-
cate their distinctive contextual embeddings. This explication elab-
orates that embedding and is, reflexively, elaborated by it: in this
strong sense, utterance/sequence and context are ongoingly recipro-
cally embedding. This means, of course, that sequence and specific
context are non-extractable from each other. This of course, might
even render questionable a family resemblance model of bringing data
instances together. Whether such a model can handle such highly spe-
cific, distinctively identifying variations in phenomenal detail must for
now remain an open question. It may be that what we need to con-
sider is a single instance approach: an item of speech-in-its-distinctive-
context, i.e. a much more radical single instance approach than that
presently employed in CA.
So, for instance, in Wieder’s study, the utterance “you know I can’t
organize a baseball game”, said by an inmate of the parole institu-
tion to a staff member who has asked him to do so, indexes a shared
understanding of that particular setting, to a code of non-cooperation
maxims informing that specific context. The refusal is a move in that
particular game, played at just that time and in these circumstances.
To remove it from that game and to focalize some of its formal proper-
ties (e.g. as part of the equivalency class ‘adjacency pairs’) is to leech
much of the interactive life from it, leaving only skeletal remains. To
further treat it as an isomorph and bring it into an equivalence rela-
tion with other items of speech, other alleged isomorphs, gathered
elsewhere and similarly denuded, is a major conflation. After all, these
other items of speech were other moves in other games occurring in
other, very distinctive and very different, phenomenal fields.
Perhaps the most serious issue arising from the above is that such
activities as collocation, collection and comparison in CA are thereby
rendered intersubjectively problematic, since in removing them from
their context they have been shorn of their specific intersubjective
sense and treated as equivalent with other times, similarly shorn.
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To use Dr. Samuel Johnson’s famous phrase, such heterogeneous
instances are ‘yoked by violence together’. It is in this sense that equiv-
alence classing in CA may be seen as intersubjectively problematic,
whatever the purpose of that classing—be it comparison or anything
else.
Of course, CA itself has a strong notion of context. Schegloff has
written widely and often about the notion of context. (e.g. in Duranti
and Goodwin, , p. –) and his writings on this matter have
great depth and subtlety. Indeed, in their own terms they cover sev-
eral (though not all) of the features of context that are highlighted
by the notion of gestalt contexture. Similarly, Schegloff argues for
an intersubjective warrant for his analysis as we have, at least indi-
cated, above. But, with all due respect to Schegloff, even if we set aside
the notion of gestalt contexture, we may therefore ask whether the
CA practices of collocating, collecting and contrasting actually even
meet his own methodological constraints and requirements concern-
ing interlocutors’ orientations.
One outcome of moving towards the notion of gestalt contexture
is that we may be able to stop referring to ‘talk’ and its ‘context’ in
submerged binary terms. Talk is not embedded in context it is inex-
tricably enmeshed in it: indeed, talk is context and context is talk.
Through the notion ‘gestalt contexture’ we might begin to refer to con-
textualized speaking in unitary rather than binary terms, and this can
become part of our EM project of abolishing binary oppositions such
as ‘action’ and ‘structure’ (of which the ‘talk’ and ‘context’ binary is a
close relative). It is not that such gestalt contextures contain no ‘gener-
al’ resources such as membership categories, sequences, etc., but that
these skeletal resources are ‘filled out’ and attain very specific func-
tional significances within each particular gestalt. We might say that
these ‘general’ resources express a ‘kaleidoscopic’ significance with the
other gestalt elements: if one shakes the kaleidoscope one changes the
pattern and one utterly reshapes the place and expression of the puta-
tively general resource within that new pattern. So it is with talk, which
consists of an immense variety of elements that on any given occasion
take on a very specific gestalt determination, specifiable only by analy-
sis of that gestalt as such. The fact that some resource is ‘general’ does
not indicate that it has a standard supra-contextual meaning, function
or determination, and as a consequence does not indicate that any phe-
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nomenologically meaningful comparison can be effectuated.
This article has established a distinction between laic and professional-
analytic comparison in CA, and has identified a range of problems
attaching to the latter. The article then proposes an EM-sensitive
respecification of CA, where professional-analytic comparative oper-
ations would not figure in any focal way. The more we take seriously
Garfinkel’s later considerations, the more sceptical we should be about
the role of comparison in the analysis of natural language use, despite
the exhortations of some “sympathetic” linguists and sociologists to
the contrary. Indeed, the de-sociologising of CA by some linguists
seems to comprise a case of ‘out of the frying pan and into the fire’
in this respect (and others), with regard to considerations of intersub-
jectivity.
A few EM practitioners write of hybrid disciplines—an ethnomethod-
ological physics or ethnomethodological mathematics, for example
(see Livingston, ). We might consider that an ethnomethod-
ological conversational analysis (to use George Adoff ’s phrase: per-
sonal communication, ) or conversation-analytic ethnomethod-
ology might emerge from our attempts to forge a secure notion
of intersubjectivity-in-action—and, indeed, more convincingly than
some of the other proposed hybrids.
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